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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is within the jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Issue: Did the trial court err in declining to bind Defendant over on burglary? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"The determination of whether to find a criminal defendant over for trial is a question of law" 
reviewed without deference to the trial court. State v. Clark, 200 1UT 9, f 8, 20 P.3d 300. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 provides: 
(1) An actor is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in 
a building or any portion of a building with the intent to commit: 
(a) a felony; 
(b) theft;. . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count of burglary. R. 3. At preliminary hearing, the Court 
declined to bind the Defendant over for trial. R. 20, 26-27. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In addition to the facts stated in the Appellant's brief, Appellee states the following additional 
facts. See Utah R. App. P. 24(b)(1) (appellee may rely upon appellant's statement of facts). 
At preliminary hearing on the charge burglary, the State's purported victim squarely 
admitted that the defendant "had the right to be over at my property." R: 32:15. 
She clarified, reiterated, and expanded: "I told the cops . . . it was okay for him to be over 
there, and I don't want to press any charges" but that the police had later stated to her, "We have 
enough evidence that we have to prosecute no matter what you say." R: 32:18 (emphasis added). 
The Prosecutor cross-examined his own witness, pressed her on this point, but she held firm: 
Q. So your testimony is that you allowed him to go into your 
house on that day? 
A. Yes. I don ythave any problem with him going in my house 
because I know heys not goin2 to steal anything. 
Q. Did you tell the cops that you had authorized him to go into your 
house? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Okay. Did he make - did he ever call you prior to this incident 
happening - prior to him going into your house? Did he call you 
before that? 
A. Yeah, he called me and I -
Q. Did he call you before the incident that day? 
2 
A. I think so. I think so. I just don't remember. 
Q. Do you remember if he called you before the incident happened? 
A. I think he - I'm pretty sure he did. 
Q. Do you remember whait he said to you? 
A. He said basically, "Fm going to come over today," but I didn't know 
what time, and then I took off in the car, and then when I came back 
- when I was at Wal-Mart I stopped by his house and his hands were 
cut up and the cops were over at the neighbors. So I was kind of in 
the dark. I didn't know what was going on. I didn't even know what 
had happened then. 
Q. Did you tell him when he called you before the incident that he could 
not go into your house? 
A. No, I didn't. 
Q. Okay. I - do you know if anything was missing from your house? 
A. There wasn't anything. 
Q. You checked your house and there was nothing missing? 
A. Yeah. Everything was there. Everything was there. 
R: 35:19-20 (emphasis added). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Court did not err in not binding over a defendant on burglary charges given that the 
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State's directly disavowed under oath that she was burgled - that she had given the Defendant 
permission to enter the home. 
ARGUMENTS 
Bind-over is appropriate if the Court determines that there is "sufficient evidence to support 
a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it." State 
v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, f 16, 20 P.3d 300. 
While admittedly the Clark standard defines narrowly the court's role in evaluating evidence 
at the preliminary hearing stage, Clark explicitly reaffirms the court's critical responsibility to 
"ferret [ ] out... groundless and improvident prosecutions.f' Id. at fflf 16 (second alteration in original) 
(quotations and citations omitted). 
It is important to note that Clark did not involve a preliminary hearing in which the State's 
alleged victim directly disavows the prosecution's case and required elements of the charged crime, 
and thus affirming the non-bind-over in this case would not be contrary to Clark, but would rather 
be appropriately based on a distinction of the unique facts of the present case. Certainly, a burglary 
case in which the State' s alleged victim directly and, even upon cross-examination by the prosecutor, 
disavows any notion that the Defendant did not have permission to be in the home in question and 
states that she communicated her permission to him prior to the events in question, is an example 
of a case in which a court certainly must be given the leeway to decline to bind over. 
The logical extension of a ruling that bind over was mandatory in this case would signal a 
complete abandonment of the court's duty to ferret out cases which should not be allowed to 
proceed, as demonstrated in the following scenarios: 
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— If the alleged victim in a rape case affirmatively testifies that the sex between her and 
the defendant was consensual, must the court still bind over based on other 
peripheral evidence potentially yielding some possible inference to the contrary? 
— If the alleged victim in a theft case affirmatively testifies that she gave the item 
alleged to have been stolen to the defendant, must the court still bind over based on 
other peripheral evidence potentially yielding some possible inference to the 
contrary? 
— If the alleged adult victim in a kidnaping case affirmatively testifies that she went 
with the defendant by choice and willingly, must the court still bind over based on 
other peripheral evidence potentially yielding some possible inference to the 
contrary? 
Just as the answer to the above scenarios is that a prudent judge should not bind over in such 
cases, so did the judge in this case act prudently in declining to bind over a burglary charge where 
the alleged victim affirmatively testifies that she gave the Defendant permission to be in the home, 
despite some other peripheral evidence potentially yielding some possible inference to the contrary. 
The State does not cite a single case in which a Court has overturned a decision not to bind-
over a burglary defendant when the alleged victim indicated at preliminary hearing that she gave the 
defendant permission to enter the home; indeed, the State does not even cite a case addressing this 
specific issue. The absence of such case law suggests the rarity and improvidence of a prosecutor 
prosecuting a burglary case when the victim's position is that the defendant had permission to enter 
the premises (in other words, it is appellee's counsel's suggestion that such cases do not show up in 
the appellate case law because such cases are usually not - if ever - prosecuted). Indeed, reversing 
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the non-bind-over in this case would, on a pragmatic level, be pointless: where is a prosecutor going 
to go in a burglary case where the alleged victim directly and solidly denies under oath that she was 
burgled? 
It is instructive to note that unlawful entry alone is not sufficient to support a reasonable 
inference that the defendant entered with the intent to commit a felony or a theft. See State v. Pitts, 
728 P.2d 113,117 (Utah 1986). Courts have found such intent based upon, e.g., the possession of 
stolen property following the entry. See id. No such fact exists in this case - nothing was stolen; 
the alleged victim confirmed and reconfirmed this upon harsh cross-examination by the prosecutor. 
And, more importantly, the alleged victim testified she gave the Defendant permission to enter the 
premises, albeit not by breaking the window; but, again, unlawful entry alone is not sufficient to 
support a reasonable inference that the defendant entered with the intent to commit a felony or theft. 
See id. The State relies upon State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174 (Utah 1985) to argue that burglary can 
be established even without a showing that the defendant had taken anything, but again this misses 
the point; in the case at bar, the Defendant had permission to enter the premises, unlike the 
defendants in Porter or Pitts. 
CONCLUSION 
The alleged victim's direct disavowal of the burglary charge through her sworn testimony 
that she gave permission to defendant to enter the premises justifies the court's decision to not bind 
the defendant over on the burglary charge in this case. 
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Clark imposes a strict standard, but does not mandate bind-over in these unique facts. 
Dated this • day of O Jr. 
Randall C. Allen 
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee 
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